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A META-THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE:
VINDICATING THE RULE OF LAW
Jens David Ohlin*
International criminal procedure is in a second phase of develop-
ment, moving beyond the common law/civil law dichotomy and
searching for its sui generis theory. The standard line is that interna-
tional criminal procedure has an instrumental value: it services the
general goals of international criminal justice and allows punish-
ment for violations of substantive international criminal law. How-
ever, international criminal procedure also has an important and
often overlooked intrinsic value not reducible to its instrumental
value: it vindicates the Rule of Law. This vindication is performed by
adjudicating allegations of criminal violations that occurred during
periods of anarchy characterized by the absence of domestic proce-
dural law. This suggests a theoretical insight: the anti-impunity
norm and its concern with punishment should be read in tandem with
a meta-theory that emphasizes that international criminal procedure
has an irreducibly intrinsic value because it returns legal process to
procedural vacuums. The present literature generally ignores this
non-consequentialist value. In addition to this theoretical reorienta-
tion, several practical consequences follow, including a revised
understanding of the principle of legality, the importance of local
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procedures, the use of guilty pleas and plea bargaining, and in
absentia trials. Although the meta-theory does not dictate which of
these procedural devices should be used, it does provide a new
standard with which to evaluate them.
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INTRODUCTION
Procedure was largely absent from the great scholarly debates that grew
out of Nuremberg. Claims of victor's justice and nullum crimen sine lege
continue to be debated by scholars who evaluate the substance of the charges
at Nuremberg and whether they were already offences, codified or
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customary, under international law, and whether defendants had adequate
warning that their conduct was criminal and would subject them to punish-
ment.' But equally important to the outcome of the trials were the proce-
dures adopted for how the trials would function.2 With jurists from the US,
France, and Russia all participating, coming up with a workable compromise
generated several questions: Would judges follow the inquisitorial or adver-
sarial model?3 Would trials in absentia be allowed? 4 Would evidence be
shared between the parties through the common law discovery method?5
Would defendants have the right to represent themselves in court without an
1 See, e.g., William H. Rehnquist, 2003 Albritton Lecture: The Supreme Court and the Dis-
puted Election of 1876, 55 ALA. L. REV. 527, 534 (2004) (noting domestic criticism, on ex
post facto grounds, of Jackson's decision to take leave of absence to serve as chief prosecutor
at Nuremberg); Bernard D. Meltzer, Robert H. Jackson: Nuremberg's Architect and Advo-
cate, 68 ALB. L. REV. 55, 60-61 (2004) (rejecting previously held position that Kellogg-Briand
Pact solved the ex post facto problem); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE NUREMBERG CASE 121
(1947) (ex post facto principle inapplicable at Nuremberg).
2 Compare CHRISTOPH J.M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
22 (2001) (discussing flaws in procedural order but noting that generally the tribunal was
viewed as procedurally fair) with NEIL BOLSTER & ROBERT CRYER, THE TOKYO
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL: A REAPPRAISAL 35-36 (2008) (discussing procedural
objections by Hirota as substantially circumscribed version of rules and procedure normally
applied by military tribunals). Of particular note was Hirota's concern that Article 13(a) of
the Tokyo Tribunal's charter explicitly stated that the tribunal was not bound by the "technic-
al" rules of evidence. Id. at 35.
3 Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg,
Tokyo, The Hague and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725, 729-30 (1999) (concluding
that the IMT trials were adversarial but they used more liberal evidentiary standards from in-
quisitorial systems). The IMT trial procedures were contained in articles 17-24 of the Nu-
remberg Charter and a separate Rules of Procedure containing 11 rules. See Charter of the
International Military Tribunal and Rules of Procedure, in I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 14-16, 19-23 (1947) [hereinafter
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS].
4 Martin Bormann was convicted in absentia at Nuremberg. See Nuremberg Charter, supra
note 3, article 12 (specifically authorizing in absentia proceedings "in the interests of jus-
tice"). Bormann was given notice via radio and newspapers in his home city. See Order of
the Tribunal Regarding Notice to Defendant Bormann (Oct. 18, 1945), Goring et al., in 1
TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 3, at 102-03. The issue of in absentia trials
is analyzed in William A. Schabas, In Absentia Proceedings before International Criminal
Courts, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW
(G6ran Sluiter & Sergey Vasiliev eds., 2009).
5 The rules at Nuremberg allowed the defense to apply to the tribunal for production of docu-
ments referred to in the indictment. See Rules of Procedure, Rule 4(e), in I TRIAL OF THE
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 3, at 20-21.
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attorney? Although these decisions had a substantial impact on the outcome
of the Nuremberg cases, the procedural aspects took a back seat to
substantive criminal law in the great debates of the day.6
In one sense, this article can be seen as a correction to this oversight.
International criminal procedure as a field is gaining in momentum, but it is
usually eclipsed by the shadow of substantive international criminal law.
The first wave of scholarship regarding international criminal procedure
traced the sometimes uncomfortable marriage of common law and civil law
procedures at the ad hoc tribunals and the permanent International Criminal
Court. 7 While these courts have largely adopted the common law's adver-
sarial system, they have combined it with isolated aspects of civil law proce-
dure, including, for example, judges as fact finders (instead of juries), victim
participation (in the case of the ICC), 8 prosecution appeals of acquittals, and
other procedural innovations. 9 Judges have a larger managerial role in inter-
national criminal justice, more consistent with some civil law jurisdictions.' 0
6 See Theodor Meron, Anatomy of an International Criminal Tribunal, 100 AM. SOC'Y INT'L
L. PROC. 279, 281-82 (Mar. 29-Apr. 1, 2006) ("the Allies provided these tribunals with shock-
ingly little guidance in the way of procedure").
7 See, e.g., SAFFERLING, supra note 2, at 2; Kai Ambos, International Criminal Procedure:
"Adversarial", "'Inquisitorial" or Mixed?, 3 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2003) (discussing
misleading nature of the adversarial and inquisitorial categories); Antonio Cassese, The Sta-
tute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, 10 EURO. J. INT'L L.
144 (1999); P. Lewis, Trial Procedure, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, ELEMENTS
OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 547 (2001) (describing the Rome Sta-
tute's common law and civil law elements as a "clash of cultures").
8 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber I, Deci-
sion on the Role of the Office of Public Counsel for Victims and its Request for Access to
Documents, 31 (Mar. 6, 2008) (discussing role of Office of Public Counsel for Victims); id,
Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Appeals of the Prosecutor and the Defense Against Trial
Chamber l's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, 4 (July 11, 2008) (dis-
cussing procedure for victims to tender and examine evidence). For a discussion, see Hakan
Friman, Interlocutory appeals in the early practice of the International Criminal Court, in
THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 553 (Carston Stahn &
Goran Sluiter eds., Martinus Nijhoff 2009).
9 See generally Fabricio Guariglia, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International
Criminal Court: A New Development in International Adjudication of Individual Criminal
Responsibility, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 1111 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (discussing differences between
judge-made rules of procedure at the ICTY and the more detailed ICC Rules of Procedure
drafted by the Assembly of State Parties).
10 See Miximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal Law, 53
AM. J. COMP. L. 835, 840 (2005) ("Civil law jurisdictions predominantly conceive the judge
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A Pre-Trial Chamber at the ICC reviews and confirms indictments issued by
the prosecutor-another civil law procedure." Victims have access to the
criminal trial-a feature of some civil law systems-though ICC procedures
allowing victim participation go well beyond any currently found in either
common or civil law systems.12 The current academic analyses of these pro-
cedures have largely taken place through the lens of the so-called common
law-civil law dichotomy.'
3
A second wave of scholarship is moving beyond the common law-civil
law dichotomy towards a more functional analysis of international criminal
procedure.' 4 Less concerned with legitimizing international criminal proce-
dure by reference to practice in domestic court systems (hence the earlier
focus on common law and civil law distinctions), the new scholarship takes
international criminal procedure as sui generis and the result of unique
policy determinations. 5 Under this view, international criminal procedure is
not a deformed monster created from two ill-paired traditions, but a distinc-
tive system designed to meet the needs of international criminal justice and
less grounded by universal or common procedures from domestic legal
systems.16  Pioneering work from theorists such as Dama~ka has helped
establish the sui generis model and helped move the discipline beyond
as a public official whose role is to investigate the truth. Therefore, she has to be active and
able to pursue lines of investigation and produce evidence sua sponte, even if the parties have
not requested it.").
11 See International Criminal Court Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 121-126 ICC-
ASP/l/3 [hereinafter ICC Rules]; Guariglia, supra note 9, at 1131.
12 For recent commentary on this issue, see HAkan Friman, Participation of Victims before the
ICC: A Critical Assessment of the Early Developments, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW, supra note 4, at 205.
13 See Ambos, supra note 7, at 4-5 (arguing convincingly that the distinctions of scholars are
often inexact and exaggerate the uniformity of national practice within each "tradition").
14 See generally Mirjan R. Damatka, What is the Point of International Criminal Justice?, 83
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 329 (2008).
15 See, e.g., ROBERT CRYER ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE 353 (2007) ("Seen as a whole each procedural system is unprecedented and may
be considered as unique (sui generis)."); Frederic MWgret, Beyond "Fairness": Understand-
ing the Determinants of International Criminal Procedure, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 37 (2009).
16 An international group of scholars and practitioners, of which I am a member, is currently
working on developing general rules and principles of international criminal procedure. The
project is called "International Expert Framework on International Criminal Procedure: To-
wards Codification of General Rules and Principles of International Criminal Procedure."
HeinOnline -- 14 UCLA J. Int'l L. Foreign Aff. 81 2009
14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 77 (2009)
simple common law and civil law comparisons. 17
That being said, procedure is still considered secondary to substantive
international criminal law.' 8 The general underlying principle behind inter-
national criminal law is that criminals who perform dastardly acts must be
punished, and that some basic grundnorm (e.g. anti-impunity) explains why
the international system must step into a field-penal law-once exclusively
the domain of domestic systems.' 9 This grundnorm then generates an
account of substantive criminal law that enumerates the legal offences for
which such criminals should be liable. Then-and only then-procedure is
considered for its instrumental value in creating a legal structure that both
separates the culpable from the non-culpable and helps ensure the due
process rights of international defendants.
This is precisely the scheme that I wish to challenge in this article.
After exploring the "standard" or "traditional" view of international criminal
procedure, I will argue for a Rule of Law-based understanding of interna-
tional criminal procedure. Under this view, international criminal procedure
is also valued for its intrinsic, not instrumental, functions. In the wake of
widespread social breakdown-in the wake of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and particularly genocide-international criminal law has a
primary role of subjecting such activity to the Rule of Law. Under this view,
international criminal law vindicates the Rule of Law by subjecting conduct
arising in a lawless environment to the rule of criminal law; procedure is not
just valued for its instrumental function of allowing a substance-based sys-
tem to proceed, but also for its intrinsic quality of embodying the Rule of
17 Cf Mireille Delmas-Marty, The Contribution of Comparative Law to a Pluralist Concep-
tion of International Criminal Law, I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 13 (2003). See also Ambos, supra
note 7, at 6; CRYER ET AL., supra note 15, at 353; Prosecutor v. Delali, Case No. IT-96-2 I -T,
ICTY Trial Chamber, 15 (Jan. 5, 1997); Patrick Robinson, Ensuring Fair and Expeditious
Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 11 EURO. J. INT'L L.
569, 574 (2000). For a comparative analysis of the common law and civil law traditions that
transcends the usual interpretations, see generally MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF
JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986).
18 See generally Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure, 45
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 637 (2007) ("Neither the framers of the new international tri-
bunals nor the academic commentators have attempted to answer these questions in a syste-
matic or comprehensive way.").
19 For a discussion of the anti-impunity norm, see Max Pensky, Amnesty on Trial: Impunity,
Accountability, and the Norms of International Law, I ETHICS & GLOBAL POLITICS 40 (2008);
NANCY AMOURY COMBS, GUILTY PLEAS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 11 (2007). The
concept of the grundnorm stems famously from Kelsen. See generally Hans Kelsen, The
Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. REV. 44 (1941).
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Law. If this is correct, then arguably the value of international criminal pro-
cedure is not wholly reducible to its instrumental function.
Part I of this article will explore in greater detail the traditional, instru-
mental view. As part of that effort, special attention will be given to the
current understanding of the anti-impunity norm. Part II of this article will
then posit the competing view of international procedure as intrinsically
valuable. Specifically, Part II will advance the notion that vindicating the
Rule of Law is the grundnorm of international criminal justice. This does not
entail that the instrumental value is illusory or unimportant; rather, the claim
is simply that it has been given too much attention in the scholarly literature.
Finally, Part III will tease out the consequences of shifting from the instru-
mental view to the intrinsic model. These consequences will be divided
between, on the one hand, largely theoretical (though no less important) con-
sequences such as a recasting of the anti-impunity norm and, on the other
hand, practical consequences regarding procedural elements such as guilty
pleas and plea bargaining.
Before continuing, an important word about methodology is in order.
When one speaks about the function of international criminal procedure-
whether instrumental or intrinsic-one is implicitly invoking the goals and
objectives of international criminal procedure. Usually, such goals are un-
derstood to include respect for human rights, due process protections, etc.
However, the goals of international criminal procedure can only be unders-
tood by also making reference to the more general goals of international
criminal justice: punishing perpetrators of international crimes, creating a
historical record of atrocities, giving voice to victims through eye-witness
testimony, and prospectively strengthening norms of international humanita-
rian law.20 Procedure bears a specific relationship to these norms that we
will attempt to explore in the next two parts of this article. However, it is
also crucial that we not collapse the objectives of international criminal
justice with the goals of international criminal procedure. 21 The two are dis-
tinct and the development of this article's argument requires that we untan-
gle the exact relationship between the two. Is the latter just an instrumental
aspect of the former, or does the latter embody a rationale independent of the
former?
20 Similarly, Bert Swart considers the two essentially connected. See International Criminal
Justice and the Models of the Judicial Process, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW, supra note 4, at 93, 102-03.
21 Id. at 102 (attributing this essential insight to Dama9ka and his Faces of Justice).
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I. THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The task of this part is to flush out the traditional view of international
procedure. Under this view, procedures have an instrumental function in
that they allow international criminal law to achieve its traditional goals.
Obviously, the basic question regarding the goals of international criminal
justice is fraught with problems, and Dama~ka has written convincingly
about the limitations of finding a coherent answer to the question of the real
goal of international criminal justice.22 There is an "overabundance" of
aims, not all of which stand in perfect harmony with each other. 23 The ten-
sions between the aims often pull international criminal justice in competing
directions, complicating both the procedural mechanics and the institutional
design.24  Even offering a ranked preference order among the competing
aims is difficult. 25 Indeed, each element of the judicial process may require
a different ordering of the individual objectives or aims, thus further compli-
cating the ability to provide a global ranked order.26
A. The General Goals of International Criminal Justice
With these caveats, however, it is still possible to offer at least a prima
facie list of competing aims that international criminal justice addresses. 27
Without ranking the list, we can then use the list to consider the objectives of
international criminal procedure and how they serve, instrumentally, to help
promote the objectives of international criminal justice. These objectives
22 See Damagka, supra note 14, at 331 ("current views on the objectives of international
criminal courts are in disarray").
23 Id. at 331.
24 Id. at 332.
25 Id. at 339 ("It is easy to see that these fragmented and discontinuous pronouncements fail to
provide much orientation in dealing with the tensions among goals. Deterrence and retribution
are themselves in need of balancing, and it remains uncertain how these two conventional
aims of punishment relate to the special goals of international criminal courts. It is thus fair to
conclude that perplexing ambiguities about the proper mission of international criminal courts
persist.").
26 This point was suggested to me by Mark Klamberg. See also Mark Klamberg, What are the
Objectives of International Criminal Procedure: Reflections on the Fragmentation of a Legal
Regime (on file with author).
27 For a discussion of the various goals, see generally Note, Developments in the Law - Inter-
national Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1974-75 (2001) ("those most intimately
connected with the ICTY and the ICTR claim to prosecute in order to achieve a dizzying ar-
ray of objectives.").
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include, inter alia: (1) punishing perpetrators of international crimes; 28 (2)
creating a historical record of atrocities; 29 (3) giving voice to victims through
eye-witness testimony; 30 (4) strengthening human rights norms prospective-
ly;3 1 and (5) restoring international peace and security.32 This list cannot be
defended exhaustively within the short confines of this article and it is not
meant to exclude more controversial entries.33 However, a few brief
comments should be made about each objective.
First, international criminal justice exists to punish the highest-level
perpetrators of international crimes, as made clear both by the preamble of
the Rome Statute and case law. 34 Indeed, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in
Tadi6 made explicit reference to this goal when it offered its interpretation of
the ICTY Statute's concept of "commission" as including the doctrine of
28 See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-I-A, Judgment, Appeals Chamber, 190 (July 15,
1999) [hereinafter Appeals Chamber].
29 Statement of Judge Claude Jorda, Statement, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4161st mtg. at 3,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.4161 (June 20, 2000).30 See generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 16 (1999) ("Victims and witnesses who seek to forget
ironically may assist the perpetrators by keeping silent about their crimes. Silence about vi-
olence locks perpetrators and victims in the cruel pact of denial, literally and psychological-
ly.").
31 Id. at 49 (discussing an "environment infused by norms of human rights").
32 This was the primary rationale for the Security Council's creation of the ICTY and the
ICTR. See U.N. Charter arts. 39-41; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 325-
26 (2d ed. 2008); Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 18 passim (Oct. 2, 1995) [hereinafter Motion for Inter-
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction].
33 For arguments for restorative justice or healing, see, e.g., Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal
Remembrance of Administrative Massacre, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 471-78, 512 (1995) (au-
thor argues for restorative justice and discusses its therapeutic effects).
34 See Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Pre-Trial Chamber, Decision on
Article 54(3)(e) Documents Identified as Potentially Exculpatory or Otherwise Material to the
Defence's Preparation for the Confirmation Hearing, 49 (June 20, 2008) ("After more than a
hundred years of struggle, a permanent international criminal court has finally emerged as a
unique symbol of the fight against impunity for the most heinous crimes of international con-
cer."); Prosecutor v. Rugambarara, Case No. ICTR-00-59-T, Sentencing Judgment, 11
(Nov. 16, 2007); id., ICTR Trial Chamber, Judgment, 11 (Nov. 16, 2007). See also Rome
Statute of the Int'l Crim. Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (July 17, 1998) [hereinafter
Rome Statute], preamble ("Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the interna-
tional community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must
be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international coopera-
tion" and "Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus
to contribute to the prevention of such crimes").
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joint criminal enterprise. 35
Second, human rights groups hope that international tribunals create a
record of atrocities not just for the present generation, but one that will
survive the passage of time and continue to educate future generations about
the horrors of wartime criminality. 36 This is in keeping with what Dama~ka
refers to as the "didactic" function of international criminal justice. 37
Indeed, tribunal officials are working on creating permanent archives of their
work that will increase public access to the evidence presented at their hear-
ings (which at the moment are not widely distributed and are difficult to
access),38 long after the tribunals have executed their "completion strate-
gy."39
Third, international criminal justice allows the world to hear directly
from the victims, either through eyewitness testimony or, in a mediated
fashion, through forensic evidence of the victims after they have died.4 °
Indeed, the forensic information recovered from a mass burial site can be the
most powerful and compelling evidence emanating from the victims, even
though they are unavailable to testify directly at trial.4' Both direct and indi-
rect processes of truth-telling are crucial to the success of international
criminal justice.4 2
35 See Tadi, Case No. IT-94--A, Appeals Chamber, at 190 (July 15, 1999).
36 See, e.g., Richard Goldstone, Living History Interview, 5 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 373 (1995).
37 See Dama~ka, supra note 14, at 343-48 (discussing "the view that the central mission of
international criminal courts should be the socio-pedagogical one of strengthening the public
sense of accountability for human rights violations").
38 There has been some diplomatic controversy over which country should have custody of
the archive. Rwandan officials have argued that the documents should remain in Rwanda or,
at the very least, in Africa. See Edward Selasini, Eals out to Push for Retention of ICTR Arc-
hives, ARUSHA TIMES, (August 16, 2008).
39 The issue of the historical record is just one of the many issues related to the tribunal's
wind-up strategy.
40 For an extensive analysis, see the article by Nancy Combs in this volume. Nancy Amoury
Combs, Testimonial Deficiencies and Evidentiary Uncertainties in International Criminal
Trials, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 235 (2009).
41 See generally RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
(2002).
42 M. Cherif Bassiouni tells the following story in a letter to Judge Antonio Cassese about the
value of truth-telling:
Allow me to share with you one story which I am sure will move you as deeply as
it moved me. It was during the months of February and March [1993] when, along
with the team of 31 women, mostly volunteers, investigating rape and sexual as-
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Fourth, there is some hope that international criminal justice might
strengthen human rights norms in future conflicts. 43 This might be achieved
through a putative deterrence function, but it is unclear whether participants
in wartime atrocities will be adequately deterred by the prospect of future
criminal sanctions at either an ad hoc or permanent tribunal.4 4 First, there is
sault, we interviewed 223 victims and witnesses in the territory of the former Yu-
goslavia. One of the persons who came to speak with us was a young man in his
early 40s, but who looked so much older. He was on crutches. He used to be a soc-
cer player, well known in his community; upon retiring he opened a cafe in the
suburbs of the major city he lived in and which came to be under siege during this
conflict. He was arrested for no other reason than being of another religion, and
detained at a local police station ... There some younger guards recognised him
and, because of his past successful soccer playing, they broke his legs with rifle
butts. Then, while he was tied down to a radiator, with broken legs, they brought in
his wife and two stepdaughters, 9 and 13 years of age, and over three days they
raped them individually and in groups in front of him and in front of each other.
The three women suffered many other indignities and torture before his eyes and
then successively each one's throat was cut. They were left to die in his presence as
well as in the presence of those who were killed in succession. The ultimate ruth-
less act was his release, to live with his anguish and torment. When he came to
speak to our interviewers, he said that he lived for the day when he could tell his
story to the world. Two weeks or so later, he committed suicide. I will never forget
his story, along with so many others for the rest of my life and I can only hope for
the sake of these victims and for our own humanity that justice will be done.
The letter is quoted in Antonio Cassese, Clemency Versus Retribution in Post-Conflict Situa-
tions, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3-4 (2007).
43 See Prosecutor v. Nikolid, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, ICTY Trial Chamber Judgment, 89,
(Dec. 2, 2003) ("During times of armed conflict, all persons must now be more aware of the
obligations upon them in relation to fellow combatants and protected persons, particularly
civilians. Thus, it is hoped that the Tribunal and other international courts are bringing about
the development of a culture of respect for the rule of law and not simply the fear of the con-
sequences of breaking the law, and thereby deterring the commission of crimes."); Prosecutor
v. Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-74-T, ICTR Trial Chamber Judgment and Sentence, 571 (Dec.
7, 2007) ("international community [is] not ready to tolerate serious violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights"), citing Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-
A, ICTY Appeals Chamber Judgment, 185 (Mar. 24, 2000). See also MINOW, supra note
30, at 25. Compare with Okechukwu Oko, The Challenges of International Criminal Prosecu-
tions in Africa, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 343, 354-55 ("international criminal prosecutions have
neither delivered on the promise of social equilibrium nor served as a chastening influence on
impunity in Africa").
44 Cf Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate
Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L.R. 777 (2007). See also Mark Drumbl, Collective
Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 Nw. U. L. REV.
539, 590 (2005) (no evidence of deterrent effect in chaos of massive violence).
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the low probability of being caught; second, such individuals often face even
greater risks on the battlefield (i.e. death), such that spending time in
pre-trial detention in The Hague is hardly a scary prospect.45 Indeed, such
super-crimes may require super-deterrent penalties, which are unavailable
within the international structure due to human rights constraints on punish-
ment.46  But even assuming that deterrence is impossible, human rights
norms might be strengthened in a more abstract way. By holding public
trials, international criminal justice increases public awareness of the under-
lying human rights norms that were violated.47 Such norms are therefore
supported and strengthened by a public that increasingly views such norms
as legitimate, universal, and mandatory. 8 Again, this is part and parcel of
Damagka's didactic function of international criminal justice.49
The fifth function of international criminal justice situates it most
squarely within the larger structure of public international law. When the
Security Council voted to authorize the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR,
it did so upon a finding that it was necessary for the restoration of interna-
tional peace and security. 50  Such a finding was assumed to be a legal
requirement for the exercise of its Chapter VII authority. 51 Although the
Security Council's Charter authority had never been invoked before to create
a tribunal, the Tadi6 court upheld the legality of the tribunal's creation.
52
The ICJ has never directly passed judgment on the matter, nor is it clear
whether they could.5 3 Furthermore, the Security Council's referral power to
45 This point is explored in greater detail in Jens David Ohlin, Towards a Unique Theory of
International Criminal Sentencing, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: TOWARDS A
COHERENT BODY OF LAW, supra note 4, at 373,384-86.
46 For a discussion, see generally Jens David Ohlin, Applying the Death Penalty to Crimes of
Genocide, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (2005).
47 A classic example of this reasoning appears in Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can In-
ternational Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 10 (2001) (dis-
cussing "unconscious inhibitions against crime").
48 See Prosecutor v. Naletilid & Martinovid, Case No. IT-98-34-A Appeals Chamber Judg-
ment, 18 (May 3, 2006) (Schomburg J., partially dissenting) (criminal law as a societal
"reaction to specific threats to or violations of fundamental values"); Prosecutor v. Orid, Case
No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 720 (June 30, 2006) ("globally accepted laws
and rules have to be obeyed by everybody").
49 See Damagka, supra note 14, at 343.
so See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/Res/508 (May 25, 1993).
51 See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 455 (2d ed. 2005).
52 See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdic-
tion, at 32-40 (Oct. 2, 1995).
53 It is not clear how the ICJ might exercise jurisdiction in such a case, given that the world
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the ICC is also predicated on a finding that a referral is necessary for the
restoration of peace and security. 54 No international court operating post-
Tadi6 (under Security Council authority) has ever questioned this argument
about its own legitimacy.
If one takes this view at face value-i.e. that a finding of a breach of the
peace and the triggering of the Chapter VII mechanism is more than just a
legal pretext-then one must also take seriously the idea that a tribunal can
help restore international peace and security. Of course, it is not entirely
clear how this happens. 55 Most scholars have assumed that the answer has
something to do with the deterrence function of international criminal
justice, i.e. that the prospect of criminal liability created by the Security
Council will stop atrocities even when the Security Council refuses to
authorize military intervention.5 6 This is doubtful. But a more plausible
argument might be made that retributive considerations might yield positive
consequences in repairing international peace. 57 In such situations, victims
often demand justice for their attackers simply because they believe that the
attackers deserve punishment. 8  This is retributivism par excellence. In
giving victims retributive justice, one also encourages them to allow their
claims to be pursued in a court of law rather than settled on the battlefield. 59
Reprisals can be replaced by a non-violent forum where justice can be
court is limited to hearing disputes between states, not individuals. Furthermore, it is unclear
if the ICJ has the legal authority to overrule the Security Council, though presumably the ICJ
believes that it has this authority in at least some areas of international law. For a discussion
of these issues, see Josd E. Alvarez, Judging the Security Council, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996);
Kathleen Renee Cronin-Furman, Note, The International Court of Justice and the United Na-
tions Security Council: Rethinking a Complicated Relationship, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 435
(2006).
54 See Rome Statute, art. 13(b).
55 For critical discussions, see George P. Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin, The ICC - Two
Courts in One?, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 428 (2006).
56 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17-A, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Judgment on
Sentencing Appeal, 82 (Apr. 2, 2007). See also Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning
Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (2005); SAFFERLING, supra note
2, at 47.
57 A longer discussion of this dynamic can be found in Jens David Ohlin, Peace, Security, and
Prosecutorial Discretion, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT 185, 205-07 (Carsten Stahn & Gbran Sluiter eds., 2009) (discussing theory of interna-
tional law's collective consequentialism).
58 Id. at 206.
59 See SAFFERLING, supra note 2, at 47 ("If the victims' rights are disrespected they will not
feel vindicated by the trial process.").
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handed down and punishments meted out.60 Under this view, the internation-
al criminal process is directed not at the actual and potential aggressors (as
the deterrence theory suggests), but at the victims. This is the collective con-
sequentialism of individual retributivism. 61 Viewing international criminal
justice in this way helps illustrate the basic tension between the global aim
of repairing international peace and security and the specific aim of deciding
individual guilt. Those who are protective of the sanctity and autonomy of
the judicial process are skeptical that participants in the trial process should
be-in any way-guided by the global aims of peace and security. 62 The
preceding discussion explains that they need not be. The criminal trial oper-
ates at more than one level. At the level of institutional design, it operates to
restore peace and security, but at the internal level of adjudication it operates
autonomously to determine individual culpability. Advocates for the auton-
omy of the criminal law may be correct when they insist that considerations
of the former should not infect the operations of the latter.
In conclusion, the traditional view of international criminal procedure
takes these objectives of international criminal justice and views procedure
as way of fulfilling them. Part IB will consider the instrumental functions of
international procedure and their relationship to the overall objectives of
international criminal justice just described.
B. The Instrumental Functions of International Criminal Procedure
There are many instrumental functions of international criminal proce-
dure and there is no need to catalogue every one of them. However, any
convincing list should include at least the following functions: (1) separating
the culpable from the non-culpable; (2) ensuring due process protections; (3)
finding the historical truth; and (4) allowing structured victim participation.
Each of these functions will be considered in further detail.
1. Culpability Determinations
The procedural dimension of the judicial process structures, to a large
extent, the control and handling of evidence to be presented at trial.63 These
60 See Osiel, supra note 56, at 1812.
61 See Ohlin, supra note 57, at 205.
62 Cf GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW 109-10 (2007).
63 See CASSESE, supra note 32, at 413 passim.
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procedural mechanics dictate how admissible evidence will be channeled to
the various parties and at what stages of the judicial process this disclosure
will take place.64 Access to evidence can be either freely exchanged by the
parties, exchanged via compulsion or threat of judicial sanction, or
maintained in the custody of an investigating judge. Regardless of the
method, international criminal procedure focuses on designing a trial frame-
work that allows the admission of relevant evidence and the exclusion of
irrelevant evidence. 65 The goal of this procedural matrix is to distinguish be-
tween culpable perpetrators and non-culpable defendants.66
The relationship between evidence and guilt or innocence is obvious,
but it is less obvious how to structure evidence handling to promote a court's
determinations of guilt and innocence. In one sense, global access to all evi-
dence would arguably promote the goal of making culpability determinations
better, but this is far from certain. 67  Indeed, it is well understood that
information loses heuristic value as its collective size begins to outgrow the
capacity of humans to evaluate it. Consequently, a mountain of relevant and
irrelevant evidence will only obfuscate, misdirect, and hide the most relevant
64 See, e.g., ICC Rules, Rules 63-84; International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Re-
sponsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territo-
ry of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 89-98,
IT/32/Rev. 42 (Nov. 4, 2008) [hereinafter ICTY Rules]; Int'l Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 89-98bis (Mar. 14, 2008) [hereinafter ICTR Rules].
65 See CASSESE, supra note 32, at 414 (discussing lack of technical rules for handling evidence
to ensure that all relevant information is presented).
66 Ideally, the procedures should also promote the goal of distinguishing between levels of
culpability as well, so that a culpable perpctrator's level of culpability might also be estab-
lished. This is necessary so that international criminal law may determine the appropriate
sentence for each convicted defendant. For a discussion of the idea that international trials
should establish a defendant's level of culpability at the level of the charge (as opposed to just
at sentencing), see Jens David Ohlin, Three Conceptual Problems with the Doctrine of Joint
Criminal Enterprise, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 69, 87 (2007) (arguing that if the argument were
accepted, one could simply eliminate all substantive crimes and replace them with a single
crime called "Felony" and make all determinations of relative culpability at the level of sen-
tencing).
67 See Howard M. Erichson, Court-Ordered Confidentiality in Discovery, 81 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 357, 373 (2006) ("Modem United States discovery, in both global and historical pers-
pective, far exceeds the evidence-gathering power litigants have had in other places and
times. Such broad power to extract information is justifiable as a means to gather information
needed for adjudication, not as an all-purpose public information tool. The discovery rules do
not purport to establish a broad information-gathering power divorced from particular liti-
gated disputes.").
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information.6 8 International criminal procedure allows adversarial parties to
present their own version of the relevant facts with the goal of giving the
trial judges two pictures from which they make determinations about guilt.
Discovery and cross examination allow opposing parties to test the quality of
evidence presented in court.69  Trial judges then make independent judg-
ments about witness veracity to determine defendant guilt or innocence. All
of this is required by the anti-impunity norm that demands punishment of
international criminals.
70
2. Due Process Protections
The second instrumental goal of international criminal procedure is
ensuring and protecting the due process rights of defendants.7 ' Under this
view, the criminal trial restricts executive power-whether domestic or
international-to summarily punish violators. 72 Left to its own devices, the
executive branch would simply make its own executive determinations of
68 Lawyers have a term for mountainous discovery that is meant to hide the most crucial
information: a document dump.
69 Discovery practices at the ICC have been fraught with difficulties. In traditional common
law discovery, evidence is controlled by the parties with little involvement by the court;
discovery disputes are usually resolved via negotiation and are rarely adjudicated by federal
district court judges. See Erichson, supra note 67, at 372. In inquisitorial systems, the evi-
dence is usually controlled by the court. For a discussion of the problems at the ICC regard-
ing disclosure, see Heikelina Verrijn Stuart, The ICC in Trouble, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 409,
413 (2008) ("disclosure problems are not so much rooted in the Statute, the Rules or even in
the Relationship Agreement with the UN, as in the approach by the OTP").
70 See generally Rome Statute preamble; Pensky, supra note 19, at 40 (discussing anti-
impunity); BENJAMIN B.N. SCHIFF, BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2008).
71 See generally SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS (2003). See also Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Proce-
dure: Due Process Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. 1. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 651-52
(2007) ("due process advances of the two ad hoc Tribunals may be gleaned from a distillation
of their structures and rules"); Stuart Beresford, Redressing the Wrongs of the International
Justice System: Compensation for Persons Erroneously Detained, Prosecuted, or Convicted
by the Ad Hoc Tribunals, 96 AM. J. INT'L. L. 628,631 (2002).
72 See, e.g., SAFFERLING, supra note 2, at 19 ("government or executive powers cannot arbitra-
rily interfere with human beings.. .the state was no longer conceived of as an absolutist mo-
narchy in which citizens were subjects of the ruler, but shifted to being perceived as a demo-
cratic republic"). Cf. George P. Fletcher, Justice and Fairness in the Protection of Crime
Victims, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 547, 556 (2005).
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culpability. 73 However, the criminal trial exists to give a judicial power a
check on executive behavior in the area of punishment. The criminal trial is
structured with the appropriate procedures to ensure that each defendant is
given due process of law.
Of course, as a matter of comparative law, there is great divergence in
what qualifies as due process and what this means for a fair trial.74 One
might appeal to a basic level of due process universally recognized among
civilized nations and codified in the ICCPR,75 or regional treaties such as the
ECHR.76 These rights also flow from general principles of criminal law and
binding sources of international law. 7
However, no recourse to a lowest common denominator is necessary.
At this stage, it is unnecessary to identify the exact scope of a defendant's
due process rights before an international tribunal. It is sufficient to note the
universal acceptance of due process rights-however that basic legal concept
is then cashed out.
78
The due process aspect of international criminal procedure is instrumen-
tal in the sense that it is intimately connected with international criminal
justice's objective of punishing perpetrators of international crimes. Due
process protections exist to ensure that the prosecution does not have an
unfair advantage and taint the outcome of an international trial; a prosecution
73 One can also see this tension in Packer's competing models of law enforcement. See gen-
erally Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964)
(comparing "crime control model" with "due process model"); and HERBERT L. PACKER, THE
LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
74 See ZAPPALA, supra note 71, at 15; SAFFERLNG, supra note 2, at 26.
75 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (equality before courts; fair and public hear-
ing; independent and impartial tribunal; presumption of innocence; prompt notification of
charges; adequate defense resources; speedy trial; in absentia trials prohibited; confrontation
of witnesses; interpreters; right to silence; appeal of sentence; compensation for wrongful im-
prisonment; double-jeopardy).
76 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
as amended by Protocol No. 11 and Its Eight Protocols, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (en-
tered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
77 See ZAPPALA, supra note 71, at 3-5.
78 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA4, Appeals Chamber,
Judgment on Appeal Decision on Jurisdiction, 37 (Dec. 14, 2006); id, Pre-Trial Chamber,
Decision on Confirmation of Charges, at 82 (Jan. 29, 2007) (discussing violations of proce-
dural rules as violating human rights of defendants). Cf Gordon, supra note 71, at 670 (ICC
represents "great leap forward" in the due process evolution of international criminal proce-
dure).
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with unfair advantages might convict the innocent. 79 Of course, due process
protections also cut against basic determinations of truth and culpability,
since violations might require remedies that are inconsistent with finding the
truth about a defendant's culpability. For example, the common law exclu-
sionary rule applies even when the evidence indicates that the defendant is
guilty. 80 At the international level, the best example is the Lubanga case,
where prosecutorial mishandling of the case was so severe that the Trial
Chamber initially decided that the only way to vindicate the due process
rights of the defendant was to order his release.8' This suggests that due
process protections have a more complicated relation to the objective of de-
termining culpability.
A more global understanding of the rationale behind due process protec-
tions is required. Due process protections exist not to ensure that the right
culpability determinations are made in a specific case, but rather to ensure
that the overall system is designed to restrain the prosecution from abusing
its discretion when proceeding against defendants. 82 This structural protec-
tion is designed precisely so that trials in general produce the right outcomes
and make the right culpability determinations. Evidence is excluded in the
U.S. so that police and prosecutors will behave, thus increasing the probabil-
ity that evidence in general can be trusted to be untainted.83 Similarly, the
ICC issues sanctions to protect the judicial process and avoid future prosecu-
torial misconduct. 84  So there is at least some relationship between due
process protections and correct outcomes.
79 id.
80 Cf United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
81 The decision was prompted by violations of the "rights of the accused to disclosure of po-
tentially exculpatory evidence." Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpa-
tory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecu-
tion of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10
June 2008, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC 01/04-01/06 (June 13, 2008), para. 73.
The case is discussed in Stuart, supra note 69, at 409-10. The disclosure problems were sub-
sequently corrected. For a discussion, see Alex Whiting, Lead Evidence and Discovery be-
fore the International Criminal Court: The Lubanga Case, 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 207 (2009).
82 See ZAPPALA, supra note 7 1, at 40.
83 See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-657 (1961).
84 See Stuart, supra note 69, at 410.
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3. Historical Truth
The third instrumental function of international criminal procedure is de-
signing a trial and judicial framework that promotes the historical truth-
finding goal of international criminal trials. 85 This instrumental function is
achieved by promoting the admission of relevant evidence, where "relevant
evidence" is understood to encompass information needed to ascertain the
truth of the entire conflict, as the concept is understood by professional
historians.86 This goal of international criminal procedure is often at odds
with the truth-finding aim required to adjudicate individual guilt. To the ex-
tent that the criminal trial is limited to determining individual guilt, a wider
scope of evidence aimed at capturing the collective nature of the events-
above and beyond individual culpability for specific criminal actions-may
be irrelevant.87 Furthermore, it may even be prejudicial and risk attribution
of moral or legal responsibility to defendants for the actions of others.88
Consequently, one might conclude that the historical truth-finding aim of
international trials is secondary to the more primary aim of determining the
truth of very specific criminal events.8 9 That being said, the secondary or
85 TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 54
(1992) ("establish incredible events by credible evidence").
86 Justice Jackson was well aware of the wide scope of the inquiry and noted during his open-
ing statement at the IMT that "[n]ever before in legal history has an effort been made to bring
within the scope of a single litigation the developments of a decade, covering a whole Conti-
nent, and involving a score of nations, countless individuals, and innumerable events." Justice
Robert Jackson, Opening Statement Before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
(Nov. 21, 1945), (transcript available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-
articles/speeches/speeches-by-robert-h-jackson/opening-statement-before-the-international-
military-tribunal!).
87 For a discussion of the collective nature of war and its relationship to individual culpability,
see generally George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The
Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499 (2002). See also GEORGE P. FLETCHER &
JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY 193-201 (2008) (discussing the theory of collec-
tive guilt).
88 See, e.g., Herbert Morris, Propter Honoris Respectum: George Fletcher and Collective
Guilt: A Critical Commentary on the 2001 Storrs Lectures, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 731
(2003).
89 Cf Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal En-
terprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93
CAL. L. REV. 75, 100 (2005) ("[l]t is especially important that international criminal judges
protect defendants through careful attention to the culpability principle and similar doctrines
that seek to ensure that defendants are convicted for their own conduct and not merely for the
violent trauma experienced by entire nations.").
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subordinate nature of the historical truth-finding aim does not mean that it
disappears entirely.
The historical truth-finding aim impacts international procedure in a
number of ways. First, international investigations and trials include great
redundancies of evidence. 90 Far more evidence is collected and presented at
trial than necessary to establish discrete facts relevant to proving the legal
charge. 91 International tribunals support these redundancies-or passively
acquiesce to them-because a trial involves more than just adjudication of
individual guilt. International jurists speak to the ages; they collect a trea-
sure trove of evidence to capture the larger truth of the conflict. Indeed, if
international criminal trials were unconcerned with such matters, one could
reform their procedure to advance judicial efficiency. For example, the
defense might stipulate to a long list of facts before trial that they do not
contest.92 Such stipulations would preclude the prosecution from introduc-
ing evidence to prove these facts, because the defense's concession of these
facts would make the introduction of such evidence completely unneces-
sary. 93 This would produce an enormous gain for international law, particu-
larly because trials have grown so long and complex that they can outlast the
life of a defendant.9 4  But international criminal law as a system has not
systematically encouraged these procedures, thus suggesting that there are
other factors besides individual culpability driving the international trial.
The historical truth-finding function of international criminal procedure
is related to at least two of the general aims of international criminal justice:
creating a historical record of atrocities and strengthening human rights
norms through the didactic function. Achieving greater compliance with
90 Cf Osiel, supra note 33, at 560-63.
91 The most obvious case in this regard involves Milogevi6, where the ICTY Office of the
Prosecutor made the strategic error of amending the indictment in order to create a case that
represented the totality of the situation, rather than charging the defendant simply with a few
discrete crimes. The trial became unwieldy and Milo~evid died before its completion. The
opposite example is Saddam Hussein, who was executed after he was found guilty of the very
limited offense of ordering a collective punishment; his trial for the far more significant alle-
gation of genocide in the Anfal campaign was never completed.
92 This mechanism is not often used in international trials.
93 This issue is discussed in Gideon Boas, Creating Laws of Evidence for International Crim-
inal Law: The ICTY and the Principle of Flexibility, 12 CRIM. L.F. 41 (2001) (suggesting sti-
pulations as manner of reducing trial length).
94 See generally GIDEON BOAS, THE MILOSEVIC TRIAL: LESSONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF
COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2007); G6ran Sluiter, Fairness and the
Interests of Justice: Illusive Concepts in the Milogevic Case, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 9 (2005).
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human rights norms in future conflicts requires concentrating on more than
just individual crimes. It requires that international jurists identify and pub-
licly condemn the full extent of the collective criminality. Only then will the
relevant human rights norms be adequately strengthened.
The complex interplay between the collective historical truth-finding
function and individual culpability determinations is readily apparent in the
ICTY's handling of key genocide documents from Serbia. During the ICTY
case against Slobodan Milogevi6, the court demanded access to key docu-
ments and minutes related to the activities of the Serbian Supreme Defence
Council. 95 Belgrade initially refused to turn over the documents, presumably
out of fear that the documents would incriminate not just Milogevi6 (and
other top Serbian officials) but also the state of Serbia itself-which was
facing suit at the International Court of Justice for genocide against Bosnia.
96
Apparently the Serbian government applied to the ICTY Trial Chamber for
protective measures to redact certain portions of the documents that might
damage Serbia's legal position before the ICJ, by invoking rarely used
procedural Rule 54 of the tribunal.97 Presumably the ICTY Office of the
Prosecutor was willing to agree to the situation because failure to get the
documents protected would mean that the Serbian government would refuse
to turn over the documents and they would remain unavailable for use in the
Milo~evi trial. What happened next is not exactly clear. A former ICTY
spokesperson, Florence Hartmann, disclosed in her memoirs that the ICTY
Appeals Chamber issued a secret ruling declaring that the Trial Chamber
was wrong as a matter of law to issue the confidentiality order regarding
some of the documents, but that the information should nonetheless remain
confidential because Serbia had turned over the documents with the expecta-
tion that they would remain confidential on the basis of the Trial Chamber's
erroneous decision. 98 Hartmann, no longer working for the ICTY, was
convicted for criminal contempt before the ICTY for having published this
95 See Marlise Simons, Genocide Court Ruledfor Serbia Without Seeing Full War Archive,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/world/europe/O9archives.html.
96 Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), Judgment of Feb. 26, 2007, [hereinafter
ICJ Judgment], available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p 1 =3&p2=3&case=91 &code=bhy&p3=4.
97 FLORENCE HARTMANN, PAIX ET CHATIMENT, LES GUERRES SECRETES DE LA POLITIQUE ET DE
LA JUSTICE INTERNATIONALES (2007).
98 id.
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account, though her case will be appealed. 99 Regardless of the outcome,
though, it is undisputed that key information related to the Serbian SDS was
never turned over to the ICJ,100 and that court then concluded that it had
insufficient evidence of direct Serbian involvement in the genocide to estab-
lish state responsibility for the crime of genocide. Bosnia lost the case.1°
The story highlights perfectly the complex tensions between the collective
truth of history and the individual truth of a single defendant's culpability.
Controversy regarding the ICTY's use of Rule 54, and any Appeals Cham-
ber decision regarding it, suggests continued uncertainty over the exact goals
that the procedures should be designed to promote. 102 But putting aside the
uncertainty, all of the positions proceed from the working assumption that
international criminal procedure is instrumental.
4. Victim Participation
The fourth and final instrumental objective of international criminal
procedure involves structured victim participation at appropriate junctures of
the judicial process. 0 3 Currently, the appropriate extent of victim participa-
tion is one of the most controversial aspects of international criminal proce-
99 See In the Case Against Florence Hartmann, Case No. IT-02-54-R77.5, Order in Lieu of
Indictment on Contempt, Specially Appointed Trial Chamber (Oct. 27, 2008). This raises
another procedural wrinkle: do international criminal courts have an inherent judicial power
to prosecute contempt, even if the statute passed by the Security Council does not include
contempt among its list of statutory crimes?
1oo See Marlise Simons, Court Still Weighing Genocide Case From Milosevic Era, N.Y.
TIMES, June 18, 2006, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/18/world/europe/ 8hague.html.
10' The ICJ did hold that Serbia was in breach of its international obligation to prosecute of-
fenders for the crime of genocide and required Serbia to cooperate with the ICTY. See ICJ
Judgment, supra note 96, at para. 449.
102 See ICTY Rules, Rule 54 ("The State, if it raises an objection pursuant to paragraph (D),
on the grounds that disclosure would prejudice its national security interests, shall file a notice
of objection not less than five days before the date fixed for the hearing, specifying the
grounds of objection."). Rule 54 goes on to allow redaction of documents and other protec-
tive measures. Id.
103 See Paolina Massidda & Sarah Pellet, Role and Practice of the Office of Public Counsel
for Victims, in The EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 691, 692
(Carsten Stahn & G6ran Sluiter eds., Martinus Nijhoff 2009); Sergey Vasiliev, Article 68(3)
and personal interests of victims in the emerging practice of the ICC, in THE EMERGING
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra, at 635.
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dure.104 The International Criminal Court gives victims full status as an offi-
cial party of the legal proceedings, complete with counsel and a large budget
to help represent their interests. 105 This status within the proceedings far
exceeds what is allowed in most countries, even in civil law jurisdictions
where victims can often initiate a criminal prosecution (even in the absence
of a prosecutor's decision to pursue a case-the sole avenue of launching a
criminal case in the U.S.).10 6 Setting aside the controversy regarding full
victim participation at the ICC, it is universally agreed that international
criminal procedure should allow some victim participation in the trial
process.0 7 On the most limited account, the appropriate level of participa-
tion for victims should be as witnesses. 0 8 Under this view, the formal status
is unnecessary, but allowing victims to testify in open court-and be cross-
examined-is essential. 0 9 This is consistent with the general goal of inter-
national criminal justice to give a voice to victims of war-time atrocity." 1 0
5. Background Goals
As a final point, we might also identify "background" goals of interna-
tional criminal procedure, such as the goal of implementing international
criminal justice and bringing war crimes trials from theory into reality.
Another background goal might be to conduct trials efficiently."' These
goals stand in the background because they cannot be the only goals of inter-
national criminal procedure; the system must be designed to do something
efficiently, rather than seek efficiency for its own sake. International crimi-
nal procedure creates an institutional structure that operationalizes interna-
tional criminal justice into a real system and provides a legal framework for
104 See Friman, supra note 12, at 205-6; ZAPPALA, supra note 71, at 222.
10S See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Trial Chamber, Decision on the Role of the Office
of Public Counsel for Victims, 31 (Mar. 6, 2008) (discussing role of Office of Public Coun-
sel for Victims); id., Appeals Chamber, Judgment on Appeals of the Prosecutor and Defence
on Victim's Participation, 4 (July 11, 2008) (discussing procedure for victims to tender and
examine evidence).
106 See generally CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN EUROPE (Richard K. Vogler & Barbara Huber eds.,
2008).
107 See generally Elisabeth Baumgartner, Aspects of Victim Participation in the Proceedings
of the International Criminal Court, 90 INT'L REv. RED CROSS 409 (2008).
108 See Vasiliev, supra note 103, at 637.
109Id
OId. at 706.
1 This idea was suggested to me by Alexander Zahar.
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dealing with the inevitable constraints of limited time and resources. Interna-
tional criminal justice is meaningless if it exists only on paper in the form of
a Security Council resolution or a multilateral treaty. It only gains signific-
ance when it flourishes as a real court with real prosecutors and real defense
attorneys. International criminal procedure is the legal framework to deal
with the consequences of limited resources and to resolve the tensions
created by these limits, rather than simply succumbing and closing shop. For
example, the defense has the right to disclosure of all evidence by the prose-
cutor. 11 2  However, a complex genocide case produces a mountain of
evidence and the prosecutor may be unable to perfectly comply with the
disclosure requirements in a short timeframe. Another example is a prosecu-
tor's duty to find exculpatory evidence." 3 This norm can only be unders-
tood relative to the resources of the Office of the Prosecutor. International
criminal procedure operationalizes the system by allocating burdens to the
appropriate parties and establishing standards that help balance the relevant
abstract norms with the limits of institutional resources.
Underlying all of the functions discussed above is the assumption that
international criminal procedure is essentially an instrumental affair,
designed and structured to promote the relevant goals of international crimi-
nal justice. As the following part indicates, though, this is not the only way
of understanding the international trial. One can flip the presumption and
consider international procedure as an end in and of itself. A full account
follows.
II. THE RULE OF LAW CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Something deeply disturbing happens during war-time atrocities. In
situations such as Yugoslavia or Rwanda or Darfur, the overall picture
cannot be reduced to an aggregation of individual criminal acts committed
by specific aggressors against specific victims. There is a structural context
that allows such criminal violence to occur and this structure is just as
disturbing as the individual acts of violence.
Specifically, the substantive crimes of international criminal justice in-
volve more than just regular criminal violence. These atrocities involve the
systematic breakdown of the Rule of Law. In Yugoslavia, government
112 See, e.g., ICC Rules, Rule 77; ICTY Rules, Rule 68.
113 See, e.g., ICC Article 54(1).
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forces and private militia operating with either the implicit or explicit
support of the government went door to door looking for civilians who were
then driven from their homes or transported to prison camps or simply taken
into fields and murdered." 4 Similarly, the Rwandan genocide involved
thousands of genocidaires roaming through the country looking for ethnic
Tutsis to rape, mutilate and kill."' This violence differs radically from
extreme acts of murder in the context of a functioning domestic penal
system. In both Yugoslavia and Rwanda, there was no police station to call,
no local prosecutors who would investigate what was happening, no judges
to declare these acts criminal. 1 6 The legal institutions that constitute the
Rule of Law were entirely absent, in part because governments in both cases
were complicit in the genocidal activities. '17 And it was precisely this
absence which allowed the criminal activity to continue unabated' 18 With-
out any legal officials to pursue, capture, or arrest perpetrators, or even call
their actions wrong, the perpetrators were permitted to engage in their
conduct without legal oversight of their behavior. The atrocity took place
within the shadow of anarchy where the worst human impulses were permit-
ted to escape.
A. The Significance ofAnarchy
The dynamic of lawlessness can be viewed through the lens of both per-
petrator and victim. From the point of view of the victim, the lawlessness
produces anxiety, fear, and isolation. In addition to the physical and psycho-
logical pain caused by the criminal act itself, the knowledge that no official
will respond to such attacks makes the attack even more painful. First, there
is anxiety and fear stemming from the realization that if the victim survives
the attack, there is nothing to prevent the aggressors from coming back.
Second, there is the pain associated with knowing that there is no calling to
114 For a description of the conflict, see DAVID RIEFF, SLAUGHTERHOUSE: BOSNIA AND THE
FAILURE OF THE WEST (1995).
"5 See PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED
WITH OUR FAMILIES 17 (1998) ("[Hundreds of thousands of Hutus had worked as killers in
regular shifts.").
116 Id. See also ROMEO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE OF
HUMANITY IN RWANDA 374 (2004).
117 See Linda Maguire, Power Ethnicized: The Pursuit of Protection and Participation in
Rwanda and Burundi, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 49 (1995).
118 id
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account for this behavior. The victim suffers from a widespread moral
violation but there is no official to declare that the moral violations are in
fact legal violations.
One can also view the dynamic of lawlessness from the standpoint of
the perpetrator. In such situations the perpetrators not only kill civilians,
commit genocidal murder, or violate the laws of war. They do it with full
knowledge that no police will arrive to investigate, no district attorney or
grand jury will indict them, no judge or jury will adjudicate their guilt or in-
nocence. In a sense, their conduct stands completely outside the bounds of
the legal system-the violence takes place within the structure of anarchy.
This sounds like a paradox, of course, but anarchy does indeed have a struc-
ture." 9 It is the structure of the State of Nature without a Leviathan and it is
arguably the most terrifying thing that the human mind can imagine.
120
Atrocities within the context of anarchy represent a very particular kind
of violation because the violation is not reducible to individual criminal
action. The murder of a civilian in war-time anarchy cannot be equated with
the murder of a single citizen in a functioning domestic penal system-say,
for example, a murder committed out of jealousy or for monetary profit.
There is an added element of violation present in the former that remains ab-
sent from the latter. There is an intrinsic harm created by the breakdown of
the Rule of Law, in addition to the fact that the breakdown of the Rule of
Law allows the criminal act to happen and may even promote more criminal
acts. The breakdown of the Rule of Law violates our normative conception
of what it means to live in civilized society. 21
Developing a full-blown normative account of "living in a civilized
society" is well beyond the scope of this article. But however the normative
account is cashed out, it must at a minimum include a conception of the Rule
of Law where moral violations are not only restricted by a pre-established
legal code but also executive or judicial officials adjudicate and punish
conduct that runs afoul of these requirements. 22 It is not necessary that all
violations be prosecuted; some impunity is inevitable in all sophisticated
119 See CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979).
120 See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 81 (1651) (Norton ed. 1997). For a discussion of
Hobbesian theories applied to international law, see ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN,
THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN (2006).
121 See generally JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, On the Social Contract, in BASIC POLITICAL
WRITINGS 141 (Donald A. Cress trans., 1987).
22 See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33 passim (rev. ed. 1969) (listing the
substantive requirements for the Rule of Law).
HeinOnline -- 14 UCLA J. Int'l L. Foreign Aff. 102 2009
A Meta-Theorv of International Criminal Procedure
civilized societies. But when the structure of the legal system falls below a
minimum threshold-when legal adjudication is simply absent from the
scene-then we are no longer living under the Rule of Law.'23  (This is
qualitatively different from when a criminal violation occurs within the Rule
of Law.) International criminal justice addresses this extra element of
anarchy.
B. Vindicating the Rule of Law
This suggests an altogether different method of understanding the goal
of international criminal justice. In the face of widespread anarchy and the
complete absence of law as a structure to regulate human conduct, the func-
tion of international criminal law is to restore the Rule of Law. 24 But it does
not restore the law prospectively by setting up domestic systems of justice or
repairing them in order to adjudicate future conduct. Rather, it vindicates
the Rule of Law retroactively by seeking to impose law where the usual
systems of enforcement-local, federal, or regional-have evaporated.
Understanding the retroactive nature of international criminal law is essen-
tial. The project involves shining the critical light of the law on a time and
place where the law was decidedly absent. 25 The unique value of the ICTY
and the ICTR stemmed from the decision by an international authority-the
Security Council-to use the binding power of international law, and the
U.N. Charter, to impose the Rule of Law in lieu of actual military interven-
tion.1
26
Of course, all criminal law is retroactive in some sense: it involves, by
definition, the ex post adjudication of past conduct.' 27 Although penal
statutes are drafted ex ante, the bulk of the work of the criminal law happens
after the violation has occurred and institutional actors are called upon to
123 A complete conception of the Rule of Law is beyond the scope of this article, though a
more complete discussion of the concept's role in this argument is presented infra in Part
111B2. See also Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1 (2008)
(concluding that the concept of law and the concept of the Rule of Law are intertwined).
124 Cf Damaka, supra note 14, at 330 ("Criminal courts, we shall contend, should play a
more modest role in advancing the rule of law in the domain of international politics.").
125 See COMBS, supra note 19, at 11.
126 See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J.
INT'L L. 365, 385 (1999).
127 See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL
LAW DOESN'T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 109 (2006).
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evaluate culpability. In contrast, international criminal justice is retroactive
in a much deeper sense. Of course, international trials are ex post and
attempt to right a legal (and moral) wrong. More specifically, though, inter-
national criminal justice involves the establishment and development of
actual institutions, often created ex post, to retroactively judge the conduct of
individuals whose actions have taken place within the wake of widespread
anarchy.
This is also the most controversial aspect of international criminal
justice. The retroactive nature of Nuremberg and Tokyo sparked claims of
victor's justice. 128 Did the prosecutions violate the principle of legality? 129
These problems were about more than just substantive international criminal
law; they cannot be reduced to the question of whether aggression or crimes
against humanity were pre-existing international crimes yielding individual
liability. 3 ° These questions have certainly dominated the scholarly debate,
but the procedural aspects were equally troubling. Could a tribunal set up by
the Allies adjudicate the guilt of the Axis powers, regardless of the crimes in
question? What authority did the Allies have for establishing an ad hoc
judicial authority, established quickly for the purpose of passing judgment
on the crimes of the Axis powers and then disbanding after the sentences
were handed down? 131 What kind of legal system was that?
Arguably, the retroactive nature of international criminal justice has
been fundamentally altered by the ICC; the Rome Statute now establishes a
pre-existing prospective legal order to govern future armed conflicts. Unfor-
tunately, though, the prospective nature of the Court does not fully resolve
the problem of retroactivity. The ICC still involves the imposition of order
retroactively because the adjudicative functions of the ICC are not present at
the time of the atrocities. The ICC can prosecute war criminals who are
turned over to the court, but they cannot create a fully functioning legal
order-complete with police officers, local prosecutors, local judges-to
128 See Meltzer, supra note 1, at 57 (discussing French objections to provisions in the Nurem-
berg Charter that arguably violated the ban on retroactive legislation).
129 See TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 635 (arguing that the IMT operated with general interna-
tional approval).
130 The procedural dimensions of the Tokyo tribunal are discussed in BOLSTER & CRYER, su-
pra note 2, at 102 ("There are few defenders of the procedural fairness of the trial. Some rely
on the Charter guarantees, others conclude that the process itself was generally fair, whilst
some suggest that the trial met the minimal standards of due process required of military
commissions trying enemy offenders.") (footnotes omitted).
131 For a discussion of the creation of the Tokyo International Military Tribunal, see id. at 20
(discussing legal significance of Potsdam Declaration).
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respond quickly to criminal behavior like a functioning domestic penal
system would. The ICC is removed both in time (trials are far in the future)
and place (in The Hague). Indeed, the ICC's scheme of complementary
jurisdiction preserves the court as a gap-filling institution meant to allow for
international adjudication of conduct only when the national jurisdictions are
unwilling or unable to prosecute criminal behavior.132 By its very institu-
tional design, the ICC will never function like a domestic penal system that
stops criminal behavior from spreading. Rather, it works retroactively to
vindicate the Rule of Law.
33
We have now traveled a far distance from our original distinction
between the instrumental and intrinsic functions of international criminal
procedure. The Rule of Law conception of international criminal procedure
advanced in this part suggests that international criminal procedure has an
intrinsic function that cannot be reduced to its instrumental functions. A
trial does more than simply advance the traditional goals of international
criminal justice, such as repairing international peace and security or ending
impunity; instead, trials have a value that is inherent to the judicial process
itself. Subjecting lawlessness to criminal procedure-whether national or
international-is inherently worthwhile. Or, expressed differently, interna-
tional criminal procedure has a deontological moral worth and cannot be
reduced to consequentialist arguments about the increases in social utility
created by the criminal trial. Subjecting conduct to the Rule of Law is a
Kantian end in and of itself.
34
III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE RULE OF LAW CONCEPTION
There are several consequences to this view, all of which need to be
considered. The first group of consequences is largely theoretical: we must
reorient our understanding of the relative importance of international subs-
tantive law and procedure and we must reinterpret our understanding of the
anti-impunity norm. (Several objections to the theoretical account will also
be presented and addressed in this part.) The second group of consequences
is more practical: greater sensitivity to local procedures, caution regarding
132 See Kevin Jon Heller, The Shadow Side of Complementarity: The Effect of Article 17 on
the Rome Statute on National Due Process, 17 CRIM. L.F. 255, 255-280 (2006).
133 See infra Part 111B2 for a full defense of the centrality of the Rule of Law in this argument.
134 See generally Kevin Jon Heller, Deconstructing International Criminal Law, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 975 (2008).
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guilty pleas and plea bargains, and a recasting of the argument about in
absentia trials. Each will now be considered.
A. Theoretical Consequences
If the Rule of Law conception is correct, then international criminal
procedure should never be secondary. 35 Traditionally, international lawyers
have treated the substantive law as primary, with procedure holding a
secondary function: the procedure is meant to aid the system in making de-
terminations about the substantive law. 136 Consequently, substantive inter-
national criminal law is well developed, but international criminal procedure
is still at a nascent phase (though quickly developing). 37
A fundamental reorientation is required. International criminal proce-
dure is far more primary than previously thought. Since the whole goal of
international justice is to vindicate the Rule of Law, the procedures used by
the international trial are not just means to another end, but also an end itself.
Subjecting the conduct to meaningful review is an independent objective of
international justice-the process makes international trials important. It
represents the stance of the world community that no place should be exempt
from the power of the legal order to judge individuals for their conduct.
At the conceptual level, international criminal procedure precedes subs-
tantive criminal law. It ought to take precedence in our scholarly evaluation
of the enterprise and at the practical level. The judges of the ICTY continue
to revise and refine their Rules of Procedure and Evidence, an on-going
process made possible by the authority of the judges to enact new rules of
procedure. 3 8 In contrast, the judges at the ICC have less authority and the
Assembly of State Parties (which negotiated the ICC Rules of Procedure) is
currently bogged down with the task of negotiating a working definition for
the crime of aggression. 39 The judges who preside over trials at both tribun-
135 Indeed, even the distinction between substance and procedure may be suspect. See
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 10-14 (1998).
136 Cf SAFFERLING, supra note 2, at 4.
137 Id. at 23.
138 See ICTY Statute art. 15, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1
(1993), adopted by S.C. Res 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) ("The judges of the
International Tribunal shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the pre-
trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of
victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters.").
139 The first review conference of the Assembly of State Parties will be dominated by negotia-
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als should insist on efficient and well-managed trials. Under the view
proposed in this article, it not only matters what law the judges are applying,
it also matters how they are applying it. This is a counter-intuitive claim and
requires that we reconsider the classic relationship between international
substance and procedure.
40
One sees this most clearly in the recent shift towards complementari-
ty. 14 1 Though the ICTY and ICTR exercised primary jurisdiction, the ICC
exercises complementary jurisdiction and only prosecutes when domestic
authorities are unable or unwilling to act. 142 In situations where domestic
authorities do investigate and prosecute, they necessarily do so under domes-
tic enabling legislation and they usually apply domestic substantive law-a
perfectly acceptable outcome under the Rome Statute. 43 Why is the absence
of international adjudication-with substantive international criminal law-
not considered more problematic? Simply because the scheme recognizes
that the greatest evil is the absence of the Rule of Law, and domestic trials
(not just international trials) vindicate the Rule of Law as well. True, domes-
tic trials hopefully result in fair substantive outcomes as well, though they
are also valuable under the complementarity scheme because they vindicate
the Rule of Law as an avenue offirst resort. 144
If the Rule of Law conception is correct, we also need to reinterpret the
anti-impunity norm that underlies much of international criminal law. 145 If
procedure is inherently valuable, then punishing criminals for their culpable
conduct is not the primary function of international criminal justice, as the
traditional understanding of the anti-impunity norm suggests. The goal is
not just preventing international criminals from escaping their just deserts,
but insisting that no conduct stands outside the scope of legal regulation. In
far away places where the Rule of Law has broken down there will be an
tions over adopting a definition for the crime of aggression; amendments to the Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence are not likely to receive the same level of attention.
140 The distinction between substance and procedure is often taken for granted by internation-
al lawyers, though the dividing line is difficult to draw. See FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF
CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 135, at 7-23.
141 This idea was suggested to me by Fr~dric Mdgret.
142 See Rome Statute, art. 17. For a discussion, see Heller, supra note 132, at 256 (discussing
whether procedural failings at the domestic level allow the international court to seize juris-
diction over a situation).
143 See Rome Statute, art. 17(1) & 17(2).
144 For a full discussion of the relevance of substantive outcomes to the Rule of Law, see infra
Part IIIB 1.
145 See also supra note 19 and related text.
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international legal institution that insists on vindicating the Rule of Law.
None of this entails that substantive law is irrelevant. Nor does the
argument imply that punishment is irrelevant. Both are central to our under-
standing of international criminal law. But the current emphasis on substan-
tive criminal law and punishment has led us to turn the equation upside
down. Subjecting behavior to legal adjudication is the central aspect of the
international trial from which all other elements then flow. Once we are
committed to ensuring an international procedure to vindicate the Rule of
Law, then and only then do the demands of substantive law and punishment
come into play, not the reverse. The distinction is subtle.
B. Objections to the Rule of Law Conception
Before continuing with the practical consequences of the Rule of Law
conception, we should consider and respond to two objections. The first
deals with the relationship between procedure and substance and the second
questions whether we have met our burden of developing a full fledged
account of the Rule of Law.
1. Procedure without Substance
The first major objection is that it is incoherent to speak of procedure
without substance or to speak of procedure as preceding substance. There are
at least two versions of this objection. First, procedure is never independent
of substance because the only way to identify "fair" procedures-procedures
that vindicate the Rule of Law-is to determine which procedures produce
the right outcomes. If one cannot define the procedures without reference to
the outcomes, then it seems impossible to think of the procedural aspect as
anything other than instrumental. The second objection is that procedure is
necessarily secondary because it is impossible to imagine an international
trial-or any criminal trial-without substance. Although we argued earlier
that applying procedure and vindicating the Rule of Law is more important
than applying the substantive law, it is impossible to hold a trial that is pure
procedure. This implies a reductio ad absurdum, i.e. we have given proce-
dure far too prominent a place in our theory. Maybe applying substance and
producing the right outcomes (punishment for the culpable) is the primary
rationale.
The first objection appeals to procedural justice and its alleged indepen-
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dence from substantive justice. One way of understanding the objection is to
think of a well-known debate between Habermas and Rawls over competing
conceptions of the public use of reason. Habermas advanced a procedural
theory that stemmed from the legitimate public use of reason-a conception
that he claimed was far more modest that Rawls' substantive theory of jus-
tice as fairness. 146 It would appear that this article advances a quasi-
Habermasian vision of international trials that relies on procedural justice.
Rawls' response to the objection was to insist that procedural justice and
substantive justice were connected because the fairness of the procedures
(whether in the political or legal sphere) depended in part on whether they
produced the right (i.e. fair) substantive outcomes. 147  It was therefore
implausible for Habermas to suggest that his own account could be purely
procedural. As support, Rawls referred to the classic procedure for fairly
dividing cake: one person cuts the cake while the other person selects the
piece he or she wants. 48 The procedure is fair, in part, because it produces
the right outcome (equal slices). Procedures for justice, whether political or
legal, share the same connection as procedures for cake-splitting, though
they are admittedly more complex. 49 The argument, if accepted, suggests
that international criminal procedure has no intrinsic value. International
criminal procedure works only when it produces the right outcomes (i.e.
convictions for the guilty, acquittals for the innocent, restoration of peace
and security), which is a completely instrumental equation.
The objection, as applied to our argument here, is a straw man and need
not be directly demolished; Habermas need not be rehabilitated in the face of
the Rawlsian objection. Even Rawls admitted that though "procedural and
substantive justice are connected and not separate... [t]his still allows that
fair procedures have values intrinsic to them-for example, a procedure
having the value of impartiality by giving all an equal chance to present their
146 See generally Jurgen Habermas, Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Re-
marks on John Rawls 's Political Liberalism, 92 J. PHIL. 113 (1995).
147 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 421-23 (1993). Other advocates who support this
thesis include Joshua Cohen and Charles Beitz. Compare Joshua Cohen, Pluralism and Pro-
ceduralism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 589 (1994) with CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY
(1989). Both Beitz and Cohen influenced Rawls' presentation of his argument. See RAWLS,
supra, at 422 n.68.
148 See RAWLS, supra note 147, at 422.
149 A parallel debate was held in the jurisprudence literature. Compare JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1981), with RONALD DWORKtN,
A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 57 (1985). See also RAWLS, supra note 147, at 422 n.68.
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case."' 50 Applying this insight to our discussion, it is clear that even if the
fairness of international criminal procedure is largely dictated by the fairness
of the outcomes that it generates, this is not to say that the value of interna-
tional criminal procedure stems wholly from the fairness of the outcomes it
generates. True, the value of international procedure may be partly, even
largely, derived from the fairness of the substantive outcomes it generates.
But this value does not subsume the entire value of the procedure; some of
its value stems from outcomes, some from intrinsic qualities. The problem is
that the intrinsic value of international criminal procedure has been syste-
matically overlooked. Neither the scholarly literature nor the case law gives
this intrinsic value the prominent attention that it deserves. The Rule of Law
conception corrects this oversight and refocuses our attention on the value of
international criminal procedure in vindicating the Rule of Law.
The second objection suggests that it is impossible to imagine an inter-
national trial without substance and therefore procedure is not truly indepen-
dent of substance. A trial without substantive law would have no value,.
according to this objection, so procedure cannot have value independent of
the substantive law that is applied. The objection fails because it confuses
substantive law with substantive outcomes. The claim asserted here is
simply that international criminal procedure has an intrinsic value indepen-
dent of the fairness of its substantive outcomes. This does not imply that one
could hold a trial with only procedure and no substantive law-an absurdity.
Rather, the value of the procedure is not wholly derived from the fairness of
the substantive outcomes that it generates-in this case punishment or
exoneration.
2. Rounding out the Rule of Law Conception
One might also object that this account is incomplete because we have
not detailed the exact content of what qualifies as the "Rule of Law"-an
essentially contested concept that may be difficult or impossible to define.'
5
'
Is the existence of a criminal justice system with lawyers and judges suffi-
cient to qualify as the Rule of Law? Is a written constitution (with due
process protections) required? If so, which ones: the right to remain silent,
150 See RAWLS, supra note 147, at 421-22.
151 See Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept (in Florida)?,
21 LAW & PHIL. 137 (2002) (arguing that the concept rarely resolves arguments because the
term has little settled meaning among opponents in a debate). See also JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule
of Law and its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210
(1979); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781 (1989).
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the right to counsel at public expense, the right to a speedy trial, the right to
indictment? 52 The list is problematic since even well-respected jurisdictions
differ in their commitment to these principles. Having failed to adequately
defend a robust and detailed conception of the Rule of Law, the objection
implies that the Rule of Law conception of international criminal procedure
is fatally flawed, or at the very least incomplete until a promissory note is
redeemed.
It is incomplete perhaps, but not fatally flawed. The Hart-Fuller debate
exposed a rift over whether the Rule of Law was a purely procedural norm
or whether it embodied substantive fairness.153 (Fuller argued persuasively
that even if the Nazi legal system had many of the procedures of a well-
developed legal system, it did not operate under the Rule of Law because the
substance of its lawmaking violated intuitive moral notions of justice and
fairness. 54) Even if one accepts the Fuller position, which mixes substance
and procedure together to form the basic building blocks of the Rule of Law,
it is still possible to think of the Rule of Law in elliptical terms. The content
of the list is contested, but that does not tell us much.' 55 The fact that the list
is contested does not mean the concept is trivial or that the concept is not
theoretically useful (in pragmatist terms).' 56 Such debates merely indicate
that the concept is used as the center for discussions regarding justice in par-
ticularly sticky situations.157 As applied to our current discussion, the con-
cept will be contested as we debate whether a particular international tribun-
al or domestic court is sufficiently developed to qualify as vindicating the
Rule of Law. This demonstrates that the concept works exactly as it should.
C. Practical Consequences
Having defended the Rule of Law conception against these objections, it
is time to evaluate the consequences of this shift. Is this largely a theoretical
152 Cf Waldron, supra note 151, at 154.
153 Compare Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958) with H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).
154 See also LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
155 See Waldron, supra note 151, at 154 (comparing competing lists of criteria for the Rule of
Law). See also JOH-N FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270 (1980) and JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-36 (197 1).
156 See Waldron, supra note 151, at 154.
'
57 Id. at 162-63.
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reorientation, or does it have practical consequences as well? This section
considers several practical consequences which arguably flow from this
theoretical reorientation. There may be others as well. But the brief list that
follows will start us down the path of reconsidering some of the basic ele-
ments of the international trial.
1. Respecting Local Procedures
The first practical consequence that flows from the Rule of Law concep-
tion should be a recognition that the international trial functions as a stand-in
for local Rule of Law. The international trial vindicates the Rule of Law by
adjudicating conduct that should have been dealt with by domestic police of-
ficers, prosecutors, and judges. Given this gap-filling nature of the interna-
tional trial, it makes sense that international criminal procedure should be
more sensitive to the local procedure that it replaces.
5 8
At a practical level, this counsels against a one-size fits all system of in-
ternational criminal procedure and the creation of a static body of procedural
law meant to apply at all tribunals in all parts of the world. Indeed, recent
scholarship regarding international criminal procedure seems to be moving
in this direction, insofar as it seeks to establish general and universal rules
and principles of international criminal procedure. 59 The result is a static
view of the international trial wherever it is conducted. This goal is thought
to be consistent, and perhaps even required, by our ambition of turning
international criminal procedure into a fully developed and scientific field of
law. 160
If the Rule of Law conception is correct, we might wish to resist this
temptation. Instead of a static model of international criminal procedure, a
more flexible approach would allow for specific procedural innovations in
some places and not others, depending on the expectations and legal norms
of the local culture. If international criminal procedure will vindicate the
Rule of Law that evaporated by the collapse of the domestic legal order,
international criminal law should echo the domestic system. The creation of
specialized hybrid tribunals pushes in this direction, each with their own
158 See Alvarez, supra note 126, at 409.
159 See supra note 16 and related text.
160 Cf Sergey Vasiliev, General Rules and Principles of International Criminal Procedure:
Definition, Legal Nature, and Identification, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
TOWARDS A COHERENT BODY OF LAW, supra note 4, at 19.
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national procedure and staffed by some domestic jurists, while the creation
of a permanent ICC, with a single set of procedural rules and staff, pulls in
the opposite direction.
One obvious objection is that there is no reason that international crimi-
nal procedure ought to respect or replicate deficient local systems, especially
when they are corrupt, procedurally undeveloped, or fall below basic stan-
dards of due process. Nothing in the Rule of Law conception requires that
we respect these deficiencies and replicate them at the international level.
To understand why, it is helpful to view the issue through both the lens of
the victim and the defendant.
From the perspective of the victim, the local procedures represent their
expectations about how the law will respond to violations of the criminal
law.161 These expectations are of more than just psychological comfort.
They represent a social contract between a citizen and his or her community
or nation, an understanding about how local officials will respond to allega-
tions that the legal order has been violated. This expectation is implicit in
the Rule of Law. Part of living under the Rule of Law means that officials
will follow through on their pre-existing announcements about how such
claims will be treated by the system. Citizens rely on such pronouncements
and expectations.
However, where a local system never dealt with such complaints appro-
priately, the international system obviously need not replicate such inaction.
Rather, international criminal procedure ought to be flexible enough to
invoke procedures relied upon by victims that such victims reasonably con-
sider to be constitutive of living under the Rule of Law in their home state.
To the extent that no adequate local procedures exist on that particular issue,
international criminal procedure can then exercise its gap-filling prerogative.
From the perspective of the offender, local procedures represent their
expectations about how guilt will be adjudicated in light of allegations of
criminal impropriety. This too represents a form of social contract, in the
sense that all citizens are comforted by the knowledge that the executive's
power to detain and punish is bounded by a judiciary with predefined proce-
dures for making such determinations.'
62
161 See Alvarez, supra note 126, at 403 ("For victims of mass atrocities, international justice is
not indistinguishable from national justice. The survivors of mass atrocities cannot reasonably
expect, nor are they likely to receive, the same thing from both processes.").
162 Cf Alvarez, supra note 126, at 412-13 ("[T]he ICTR's jurisdictional primacy is not pre-
mised on greater fairness to defendants but on the flawed premises of the international legal
paradigm. The rules and procedures for the ad hoc tribunals are justified on the basis that they
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This leads to a corollary of the problem considered above. If an offend-
er relies on systems of procedure that are inherently skewed against
meaningful review of criminal allegations, must international criminal pro-
cedure replicate the local system's infirmities? Certainly not, and here we
can refer to threshold requirements for procedural rights codified in human
rights instruments. 163 International criminal procedure is bound to respect
due process protections, but after that minimum floor is reached, the design
of the procedural system should reflect local procedures to the extent that it
is consistent with a meaningful system of legal review.
This suggests a new gloss on the traditional understanding of the
principle of legality. Typically, legality is understood to involve pre-
announcement of criminal law, either in the form of nulla poena sine lege,
nullum crimen sine lege, or nullum crimen sine lege scripta. And this is
usually cashed out in terms of substantive law: defendants cannot be prose-
cuted for conduct not previously defined as criminal by legislative enact-
ment. But the preceding analysis places a different gloss on the principle of
legality 64 Do defendants have a right to have legal allegations against them
adjudicated according to pre-existing procedures for which they had ade-
quate notice? If indeed the point of international criminal procedure is to
vindicate the Rule of Law, then some consideration to this principle is war-
ranted, especially if the change in procedure from the local to the interna-
tional involves such a substantial increase in legal liability that it will change
the outcome of the legal proceeding.
That being said, the Rule of Law conception does not entail a procedural
principle of legality that prevents the international system from imposing an
international procedural device that did not previously exist at the local
level. This result would be absurd and would violate the entire idea of the
Rule of Law conception: that criminal conduct should always receive mea-
ningful scrutiny, even if that scrutiny must be imposed at the international
level when lawlessness takes over at the domestic level. This is at the heart
of the Rule of Law conception. Consequently, the principle of legality
demands that the international system take into account the meaningful
constitute a proper balance between the needs of defendants and victims. International law-
yers concede that these rules are replete with compromises as to the competing demands of
defendant and victim. Whether these compromises, when paired with jurisdictional primacy,
strike the proper balance between the rights of alleged perpetrators and victims remains to be
seen.").
163 See ZAPPALA, supra note 71, at 247.
1'( Cf. FLETCHER, supra note 135, at 206-11.
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expectations of a defendant with regard to how their fate will be decided, but
only insofar as such expectations are consistent with creating a system that
vindicates the Rule of Law in the first place.
2. Guilty Pleas and Plea Bargaining
The Rule of Law conception also counsels caution when considering
guilty pleas and plea bargaining. 165 Both are areas of continuing controversy
in the literature.166 The ICTY rules originally contemplated guilty pleas but
included no explicit procedures for plea bargaining, though the exigencies of
the tribunal's operation spurred officials to gradually develop an informal
system of plea bargaining.1 67 But it is less structured than the U.S. system.1
68
Allowing a defendant to plead guilty in return for a reduced sentence
has several obvious benefits, including increasing judicial efficiency by
reducing the number of trials, giving defendants an incentive to confess and
testify against their superiors, giving defense attorneys the opportunity to
reduce risk for their clients, and allowing prosecutors to complete their work
on schedule. 169 Victims may get satisfaction from defendants who acknowl-
edge their actions, tell the truth, and even apologize.
70
But the increased incentives and efficiency gains are not achieved with-
out cost. The most important cost is that some allegations against the defen-
dant are never adjudicated according to the rich procedures of the trial; they
are conceded by the defendant in pro forma fashion. The fact that a defen-
dant concedes to certain facts or conclusions of law is not the same as having
these conclusions determined according to a judicial process ruled by estab-
lished procedure. The latter is the result of precisely the kind of rule-of-law
165 The difficulties of guilty pleas, also called "negotiated justice," have been identified by
several authors. See, e.g., Swart, supra note 20, at 107-110; Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping
a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(2002); Mirjan Damagka, Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 1018 (2004).
166 COMBS, supra note 19, at 223.
167 Id. at 58. See ICTY Rules, Rule 62; ICTR Rules, Rule 62.
168 The early experiments with plea bargaining at the ICTY were confused. Erdemovi6 en-
tered into a specific plea bargain with prosecutors but the court was told that the plea was not
in exchange for a sentence. COMBS, supra note 19, at 61. Jelisik pled guilty but still received
a 40 year sentence. Id.
161 ld. at 62.
170 Id. at 224.
HeinOnline -- 14 UCLA J. Int'l L. Foreign Aff. 115 2009
116 14 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 77 (2009)
determinations that are related to the intrinsic goals of international criminal
procedure; the former are the result of pragmatic Realpolitik and hardly
vindicate the Rule of Law with regard to those specific legal allegations. In
some cases, the facts conceded are bargained away so the defendant pleads
guilty to a small fraction of the allegations.17' But vindicating the Rule of
Law means adjudication according to procedure for its own sake-not simp-
ly punishment. Guilty pleas skip the former step and proceed via negotiation
to the second step. 172 This does not violate the Rule of Law per se, but it
does suggest that there are hidden costs associated with removing legal
allegations from the process of trial adjudication.
The exact same considerations apply to guilty pleas outside the context
of plea bargaining. There might be circumstances when a defendant wishes
to plead guilty for reasons other than a bargained-for reduction in sen-
tence: 173 accepting responsibility for one's actions, apologizing, showing
remorse, and throwing oneself on the mercy of the court to receive lenien-
cy. 174 There might be other considerations as well. There is no a priori
reason why such guilty pleas must be allowed. Many civil law jurisdictions,
as well as U.S. military courts martial, restrict the ability and manner in
which a defendant can plead guilty; it is hardly an absolute right. 175 Doing
so robs the system itself of an important opportunity.
3. Amnesties
Our meta-theory of international criminal procedure also provides a new
understanding of what makes amnesties so problematic for international
criminal law. Traditionally, public international lawyers and diplomats have
issued cautious support for amnesties, whether contained in bilateral or
171 Id. at 63 (explaining introduction of "charge bargaining" at the ICTY).
172 The standard model in the plea bargaining literature is that plea bargaining takes place in
the shadow of trial, i.e. parties bargain in order to avoid a better outcome that they would oth-
erwise receive at the end of the trial. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargain-
ing in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). The standard
model is not without its critics. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
173 The classic example is Prosecutor v. Erdemovi6, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis, Sentencing
Judgment (Mar. 5, 1998).
174 id.
175 See, e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 845 (2009); United States v. Care,
40 C.M.R. 247 (C.M.A. 1969) (requiring substantial basis in law and fact for guilty pleas).
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multilateral peace treaties or codified simply by domestic legislation.' 76
Such amnesties are often the only avenue of getting a repressive regime to
relinquish power. 177 Few in a position of power will voluntarily give up
power when doing so directly results in a criminal trial for their conduct.
Supporting and encouraging these amnesties has obvious advantages: stop-
ping civil wars faster by encouraging government forces to relinquish power.
In turn, human rights abuses and violations of international criminal law will
end sooner.178 And it goes without saying that the twin aims of U.N. Charter
system-restoring international peace and security-may also be advanced.
Criminal lawyers, and international lawyers with a criminal bent, have
traditionally been skeptical of such arrangements. 179  On one level, the
problem stems from a suspicious case of utilitarian balancing: forego the
demands of individual justice against one defendant in order to increase
overall social stability, perhaps even promote nation-building (or re-
building, as it were). The suspicion is usually grounded by some variant of
the anti-impunity norm.' 80 The anti-impunity norm in these contexts is
usually given one of two glosses. On the first version, there is an inherent
wrong involved in letting perpetrators go free; on the second version,
promoting impunity will only damage the very utilitarian considerations
(peace and stability, nation-building, stopping human rights violations) in
the long run, by giving future perpetrators hope that they might escape the
consequences of their actions by negotiating amnesties.
Our meta-theory of international criminal procedure provides an alterna-
tive account for skepticism about amnesties. Defendants not only escape
punishment but, more importantly, defendants escape the rigors of the crimi-
nal process, irrespective of whether they will face punishment or not. It
violates our conception of the Rule of Law to exempt individuals from the
procedural process that will evaluate their conduct. This is not to say that
failure to punish might not also violate the Rule of Law. It arguably does.
176 Cf CASSESE, supra note 42, at 5.
177 id.
178 id.
179 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Searching for Peace and Achieving Justice: The Need for Ac-
countability, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 12 (1996) ("Sometimes this dichotomy is pre-
sented along more sophisticated lines: peace now, and justice some other time. The choice is,
however, frequently fallacious and the dichotomy may be tragically deceptive. Surely no one
can argue that peace is unnecessary and preferable to a state of violence. But the attainment of
peace is not necessarily to the exclusion of justice, because justice is frequently necessary to
attain peace.").
180 See, e.g., Pensky, supra note 19, at 6.
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But failure to punish is arguably secondary to failure to adjudicate.
Although the two usually coincide in most amnesties, they are conceptually
distinct.
A thought experiment might be useful.' 18 Although it is rare, consider a
strongman who gives up political power in exchange for an amnesty that
only gives him immunity from punishment. For example, perhaps the im-
munity agreement states that an incoming executive official promises that, in
the event of the defendant's conviction, his sentence will be commuted or he
will be pardoned. In contrast, consider the individual whose immunity
agreement provides protection from arrest, prosecution, and punishment for
crimes enumerated in the agreement. Such agreements short circuit the
entire criminal process. It is clear that the protection-from-punishment
agreement is deeply problematic and threatens every ideal that a criminal
lawyer holds dear. But the blanket protection-from-trial is offensive to a
greater degree, and the problems stem from more than just the failure to
punish. A blanket exemption from all criminal process violates the Rule of
Law and is only marginally better than the lawlessness that international
criminal law seeks to replace.
4. In Absentia Trials
In absentia trials are frequently discussed, though rarely the subject of
serious consideration. Although the recently created Special Tribunal for
Lebanon allows in absentia trials,' 82 scholars and practitioners usually
assume that the presence of the defendant is always necessary for the contin-
uation of a trial.
83
There are multiple reasons for this assumption, though the strongest is a
perceived due process protection. 184 Ever since (if not before) the Russell
Tribunal by Sartre, Bertrand Russell, and other European intellectuals of
U.S. officials for war crimes in Indochina, 185 lawyers have been skeptical of
181 This thought experiment was suggested to me in conversation with Max Pensky.
182 See Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757
(May 30, 2007), art. 22. The ICTR Rules allows trials to continue if a defendant who makes
an initial appearance before the tribunal subsequently refuses to attend. See ICTR Rules, Rule
82bis (Mar. 14, 2008) (but requiring counsel in defendant's absence).
183 Compare with Schabas, supra note 4, at 335.
'84 Id. at 353-54.
185 See generally AGAINST THE CRIME OF SILENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE RUSSELL
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL (John Duffett ed., 1968).
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in absentia war crimes trials, notwithstanding the fact that plenty of civil law
jurisdictions allow trials in the absence of the accused, especially when the
accused has received notice of the proceedings but has voluntarily absented
himself from the jurisdiction of the court in order to avoid prosecution.' 86
Although some in absentia trials such as the Russell Tribunal were kangaroo
courts, it is doubtful that they were kangaroo courts because they proceeded
in absentia. Rather, it is more likely that the farcical nature of such courts is
dependent on other factors.
Our meta-theory of international criminal procedure suggests that we
ought to tread carefully before establishing a blanket prohibition on the use
of in absentia trials. When a defendant escapes the jurisdiction of an interna-
tional court, they do more than simply rob the tribunal of the opportunity to
punish them.' 87 They also deprive the tribunal of the power to exercise its
procedural functions to adjudicate behavior. Even assuming that there is no
possibility of punishing a defendant who cannot be located and might never
be found, the trial still has an intrinsic value of vindicating the Rule of Law.
The important part is having the trial itself, not just punishing the defendant.
Holding in absentia trials risks violating the due process rights of defen-
dants, who by definition do not assist in their own defense, do not select
their own counsel, do not confront the witnesses and evidence that the prose-
cution has marshaled against them, and may or may not have notice that
their fate is being decided by an international court. 88 Of course, a defen-
dant may be partly responsible for these consequences if they have received
notice but have voluntarily fled the jurisdiction of the court.
In the final analysis, the question is whether the due process rights of
the defendant are sufficiently grave that they outweigh the intrinsic value of
the international trial as a procedural vehicle that vindicates the Rule of
Law. 89 In this limited forum I will not hazard an answer; the variables in
the calculation are complex. However, I do insist that this formulation of the
balancing question is as important as the traditional formulation that focuses
186 The ICC can hold a confirmation hearing in the absence of the accused, but not a trial.
Compare ICC Rules, Rule 125 with Rome Statute, art. 63(1) ("The accused shall be present
during the trial.").
187 Cassese concludes that it would be an "extreme solution" to stay proceedings for defen-
dants who escape after the commencement of their trial. See CASSESE, supra note 32, at 393-
94 (defendants would be able "to stultify international justice outright").
188 Cf Schabas, supra note 4, at 353-54 (noting that Human Rights Committee case law has
not categorically prohibited in absentia trials).
189 See id at 380 (discussing balancing).
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more on punishment outcomes. Putting a procedural gloss on the question
highlights that in absentia trials could, in theory, promote international crim-
inal law's objective of subjecting otherwise lawless activity to the critical
gaze of legal evaluation, even in the absence of an actual defendant. Wheth-
er this goal is worth the costs is another matter. Another way of putting the
point is whether in personam adjudication is an essential (or dispensable)
element of the Rule of Law.
CONCLUSION
This article has not defended, nor did it attempt to defend, a complete
theory of international criminal procedure. This was never the aim. Howev-
er, we have developed a foundational theory that explains the central role of
criminal procedure in the overall structure of international criminal law. On
top of that foundational structure, specific questions of procedure remain,
many of which are not determined by the foundational account offered here.
Secondary procedural theories must be constructed in order to develop a sui
generis system, and the scholarly literature now contains a vast array of
workable theories. Underlying all of them ought to be the meta-theory that
international criminal procedure vindicates the Rule of Law. The meta-
theory as I have outlined it here will certainly influence the direction of the
second-order theories, but it will not fully determine their outcome-it is
simultaneously ambitious and modest.
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